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A Sartrean account
Uriah Kriegel
The perception/imagination distinction and Sartre
Consider this very general question: What is the relationship between per-
ception and imagination? When we consider this question, two facts pop 
out: (i) there is some commonality between the two, but (ii) there is a dif-
ference as well. Perception and imagination are alike in some respect(s), 
but also differ in some. The question is how to characterize the similarity 
and how to characterize the difference. Thus we may replace our single 
question with a pair: (Q1) What is the similarity between perception and 
imagination? (Q2) What is the dissimilarity between them? 
These questions are still ambiguous, however, insofar as the terms “per-
ception” and “imagination” are. The two nouns are most commonly used 
to denote putative faculties or capacities. These can be characterized in terms 
of the mental states they produce, or have the function of producing. 
Perception is the “faculty” that produces, or has the function of producing, 
perceptual states. Imagination is the faculty that produces, or has the func-
tion of producing, imaginative states. Thus Q1 and Q2 are best understood 
as ultimately about states (rather than faculties).
Imaginative states come in a several varieties.1 One distinction is between 
imagining an object and imagining awareness of the object: I can imagine a 
dog or imagine seeing a dog.2 Another distinction is between propositional 
and “objectual” imagining: I can imagine that Lena Dunham is elected 
president or I can imagine a purple dog. It is sometimes claimed that the 
relationship between objectual and propositional imagining is analogous 
to that between perceiving and believing (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; 
McGinn 2004). But this is misleading. It is true that both the following are 
admissible reports of imaginative states:
(1) S imagines O.
(2) S imagines that p.
But a corresponding duality applies to perception reportage: 
(1*) S perceives O.
(2*) S perceives that p.
246 Uriah Kriegel
The relationship between 1 and 2 is analogous to that between 1* and 2*. In 
both 2 and 2*, a propositional attitude is reported, but one which conceptu-
ally involves a sensuous dimension. By this I mean, it is part of the concepts 
of perceiving-that and imagining-that that some sensory experiences take 
place when a subject perceives-that or imagines-that.3 One might hold that 
occurrent beliefs or judgments also involve sensory experiences, but if so 
it is not part of the concept of belief or judgment that such experiences must 
take place. In that respect, believing is more analogous to conceiving, a 
kind of purely intellectual exercise of an imagination-like capacity. When 
one conceives that some water is not H2O, one may experience sensory 
images of a watery substance, but it is not part of the concept of conceiving 
that such imagery must occur. In sum, my claim is that belief is to percep-
tion what conception is to imagination, not what propositional imagination 
is to objectual imagination. If we add:
(3) S conceives that p
(3*) S believes that p
we may say that the two series 1–2–3 and 1*–2*–3* parallel each other in a 
relevant sense. 
The above distinctions reveal some ambiguity in Q1 and Q2. Here 
my focus will be on objectual perceptual and imaginative states—as 
opposed to propositional states or faculties/capacities. A further ambi-
guity concerns the type of similarity and dissimilarity we are interested 
in. Arguably, the most important similarities and differences between 
mental states concern (i) those pertaining to phenomenal character, in 
this case the subjective experience of perceiving and imagining, and (ii) 
those pertaining to functional role, in this case the role of perceiving and 
imagining within the subject’s overall cognitive architecture. Both are 
important, but my concern in the present paper is specifically with phe-
nomenal (dis)similarity. Thus, my topic is the following pair of questions: 
(Q1p) What is the phenomenal similarity between perceiving O and imag-
ining O? (Q2p) What is the phenomenal dissimilarity between perceiving 
O and imagining O?4

Approaches to this issue can be usefully divided into three groups.5 One 
traditional approach, more often implicit than argued for, is that perceiv-
ing and imagining are forsooth phenomenally indistinguishable. The only 
difference is extrinsic to the phenomenology: in the perceptual case the 
phenomenal state is accompanied by a belief that endorses its content, 
whereas in the imaginative case it is not.6 Another approach, associated 
with Hume, allows for phenomenal difference between perception and 
imagination, but only one of degree.7 The difference may concern phe-
nomenal intensity, or resolution, or determinacy, but perceptual and 
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imaginative experiences have the same kind of phenomenology. That is, 
they instantiate all the same phenomenal determinables, but differ with 
respect to instantiating their determinates. A third, more daring approach 
insists on a categorical or qualitative difference between perceptual and 
imaginative experience: there is a certain phenomenal determinable pre-
sent in the one that is entirely absent from the other. We may call these 
the “no-difference” view, the “degree-difference” view, and the “kind-dif-
ference” view:
(ND)  There is no phenomenal difference between perceiving O and 
imagining O.
(DD)  There is a phenomenal difference-in-degree (“quantitative” dif-
ference) between perceiving O and imagining O.
(KD)  There is a phenomenal difference-in-kind (qualitative differ-
ence) between perceiving O and imagining O.8
Historically, ND and DD have dominated philosophical thinking about per-
ception and imagination. Through a battery of phenomenological argu-
ments, however, Sartre develops a formidable case against them. In what 
follows, I will use these arguments, or suitably strengthened versions, as a 
springboard for a broadly Sartrean answer to Q1p and Q2p. 
Sartre’s interest in the imagination in fact predates all his later, bet-
ter-known philosophical concerns. His 1926 thesis for an École Normale 
Supérieure diploma was about the imagination. His thesis director, one 
H. Delacroix, was a series editor at the publishing house Alcan, and asked 
Sartre for a book on the imagination (Contat and Rybalka 1970, pp. 50, 55). 
Of the book Sartre ended up writing, to be titled The Image, Alcan agreed 
to publish only the first half (see de Beauvoir 1960, pp. 168–171), under 
the title The Imagination (Sartre 1936). The second half was published four 
years later by the prestigious publisher Gallimard as The Imaginary (1940). 
Both books are organized around the question of the relationship between 
images and perceptions. The first presents a critical survey of failed accounts 
of imagination along the lines of ND and DD, with a diagnosis of their 
underlying error. The second develops a positive account of imagination 
in a KD vein.
It is worth noting that Sartre lumps together under the rubric of “the 
image” a great variety of phenomena. Three will concern me here: images 
we willingly and deliberately conjure up, as when I decide to form an image 
of a smiling octopus; images that pop up in our mind uninvited and fade 
out soon thereafter, as when an image of my mother’s face appears to me 
suddenly; and images pertaining to episodic memory of individual objects 
or events, as when I suddenly remember the first giraffe I saw at a zoo.9 Let 
us call the first imaginative experiences, the second phantasmagoric experiences, 
and the third mnemonic experiences.10 In comparing the phenomenology of 
perception and imagination, my concern will be primarily with imaginative 
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experiences, though phantasmagoric and mnemonic experiences will play 
a role later on.11 
Against the “classical conception” 
Surveying historical accounts of imagination, Sartre isolates a fundamental 
strand he calls the “classical conception.” He identifies two central tenets in 
this classical conception.12 The first is a conception of the image as an object 
rather than act of consciousness, hence a “thing” among others; this is what 
Sartre (1936, p. 5/2012, p. 6) calls “thingism” (chosisme), which amounts 
essentially to a sense datum account of imaginative experience. The other, 
which will be our focus, is the assimilation of imagination to perception; 
this is ND: 
We begin again with the assertion that sensation and image are iden-
tical in nature. We assert once more that an isolated image does not 
distinguish itself from an isolated perception. But this time the discrimi-
nation will be the product of a judgment-act (acte judicatif) of the mind. 
(Sartre 1936, p. 101/2012, p. 91; my translation, 
italics original)13
On this pernicious view, there is no essential difference between per-
ceptual experience and imaginative experience considered intrinsically 
(“in isolation”). The only difference between the mind of the perceiver 
and the mind of the imaginer is in their second-order judgments about 
their experiences (“I am seeing a dog” vs “I am visualizing a dog”). These 
judgments must have certain grounds: there is a reason why one judges 
that one’s experience is perceptual in some cases and that it is imagina-
tive in others. It is part of the view Sartre considers that these judgments 
are based on interrelations among experiences (and standing beliefs).14 
When one’s experience coheres well with surrounding experiences 
and standing beliefs and expectations—when it is orderly, if you will—it 
is judged to be perceptual. When it is disorderly and incongruent, it is 
judged to be imaginative. 
By my count, Sartre offers at least seven arguments against this “classi-
cal conception” of imagination. But the core of his case consists in a quar-
tet of epistemological arguments of the following form: if perceptual and 
imaginative experiences were phenomenally indistinguishable, and distin-
guished only by accompanying judgments about their cohesion, our knowl-
edge of whether we are perceiving or imagining would be very different 
from the way it really is. 
First, if my knowledge that the dog presented by my current experience 
is perceived, rather than imaginary, were based on assessment of the experi-
ence’s cohesion with other experiences, it would be a complex and some-
what impressive epistemic achievement. But this is false to the epistemology:
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Rather than the nature of the image as such [i.e., as being an image] 
being revealed to us by immediate intuition, we must finally make use 
of a system of infinite references in order to affirm of a content that it 
is an image or a perception . . . Nobody will accept that recourse to a 
system of infinite references is needed to establish the discrimination 
between an image and a perception. Let everyone consult their inter-
nal experience. 
(Sartre 1936, p. 102/2012, p. 93)
Bracketing certain hyperboles (e.g., implicating infinity), the basic idea is 
this. I know that I am imagining a dog not by comparing my experience to 
indefinitely many other experiences, but immediately, that is, without the 
mediation of any cognitive process of experience comparison. Call this the 
argument from immediacy: (1) we have immediate knowledge of whether we 
are perceiving or imagining; (2) if ND were true, we could not have such 
knowledge; so, (3) ND is false.15
Secondly, knowledge of whether I am imagining or perceiving is charac-
terized not only by immediacy but also by a warranted feeling of certainty. 
Compare the judgments that 2 + 2 = 4 and that there is salad for lunch. 
The former features a characteristic absent from the latter: a feel of certainty. 
Moreover, the feeling is not misplaced—one is warranted in having it. Such 
a warranted feeling of certainty appears also to characterize my current 
belief that I am seeing (and not merely imagining) a dog. But it is hard to 
see how it could have that characteristic if it were based on assessment of 
cohesion among complex, temporally extended series of experiences:
the discriminative judgment will only ever be probable . . . We thus arrive 
at a paradoxical conclusion: far from the deep nature of the image 
being revealed to us by an immediate and certain knowledge, we will 
never be sure that such and such psychic contents on such and such a day 
and such and such an hour were really truly an image. Introspection is 
entirely deprived of its rights.
(Sartre 1936, p. 102/2012, p. 93)
Call this the argument from certainty: (1) our knowledge of whether we are 
perceiving or imagining exhibits a warranted feeling of certainty; (2) if ND 
were true, it would not; so, (3) ND is false. 
Clearly, Sartre’s central line of argument depends on a certain epistemol-
ogy of first-person knowledge, whereby such knowledge is distinguished by 
special epistemic and psychological properties. There are of course defla-
tionary accounts of self-knowledge that reject such a conception. Obviously, 
Sartre’s case against ND falls apart if we adopt one of them. This is not 
the place to defend Sartre’s epistemology of first-person knowledge, which 
arguably is a prerequisite for the kind of phenomenological inquiry he is 
engaged in. However, it bears stressing that nothing about this mode of 
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argumentation requires that first-person knowledge be infallible, incorrigi-
ble, or otherwise extraordinarily enviable. It only requires that such knowl-
edge be distinctive, that is, exhibit certain epistemic features absent in other 
kinds of knowledge. Furthermore, the claim need not be that this distinc-
tive knowledge is always present when we introspect our perceptual and 
imaginary experiences; merely that it is present in ordinary or typical cir-
cumstances.16 This too is not beyond controversy (what is?), but it is much 
more innocuous to presuppose.17
A third epistemological argument, then, appeals to the effortlessness of 
first-person knowledge. If establishing that one is perceiving rather than 
imagining required sustained comparison with many other experiences and 
meticulous evaluation of their cohesion, it would be quite effortful. But, says 
Sartre, “Who has ever made so much effort to distinguish an image from a 
perception?” (1936, p. 104/2012, p. 94) Call this the argument from effort.18
A final epistemological argument may be called the argument from incon-
gruence, as it rests on Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of surprising, 
incongruent perceptual experiences:
I believe my friend Pierre to be in America. There I catch sight of him 
at the corner of the street. Will I tell myself “it’s an image”? Not at all. 
My first reaction is to seek to find out how it is possible that he has 
already come back. 
(Sartre 1936, p. 106/2012, p. 96)
Pierre’s presence on a Paris street is unexpected (read: inconsistent with 
standing expectations). It is incongruent (coheres poorly with other experi-
ences and beliefs). But this creates no tendency to classify one’s experience 
as imaginative.19 This suggests that the experience has an independent phe-
nomenal feature which “marks” it as perceptual, and which one picks up on 
regardless of one’s other experiences and expectations. 

Might this phenomenal feature simply be the enhanced intensity or resolu-
tion of perceptual experiences, as DD maintains? Sartre’s main argument 
against this is again epistemological20:
For a sensation to cross the threshold of consciousness, it must have a 
minimum intensity. If images are of the same nature, they will have to 
have at least this intensity. But then won’t we confuse them with sensa-
tions of the same intensity? And why does the image of a cannon-blast 
noise not appear as a weak but real cracking? 
(Sartre 1936, p. 93/2012, p. 84; my translation)
Consider sensory perception of Hume’s “minimal sensibilia,” say hearing 
the faintest audible sound of a piece of furniture cracking; compare it to 
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an imaginative experience of a deafeningly loud cannon blast a meter away. 
On the one hand, it is unclear in what sense the former may be said to be 
“more intense” than the latter. Certainly it is not louder: we could not even 
be aware of imaginary sounds, says Sartre, if they were less “loud” than mini-
mal audibilia. (This remark is consistent both with the idea that imaginary 
noises have a loudness greater than minimal and with the idea—as it seems 
to me, more plausible—that they do not have a loudness at all, but only 
an imaginary-loudness.) On the other hand, DD cannot allow that imagin-
ing a deafeningly loud cannon is as phenomenally intense as perceiving 
minimally audible cracking, since it uses phenomenal intensity to separate 
the two categories to begin with. Either way, DD is unable to explain how 
we can tell by introspection alone whether we are perceiving or imagining 
when the phenomenal intensity is the same.
The same sort of argument would apply to other putative differences 
of degree between perception and imagination. Consider the view that 
perception is just an experience that uses a higher-resolution format than 
imagination. This is certainly the case with typical instances. But of course 
one can manually stretch the corners of one’s eyes to blur one’s visual expe-
rience increasingly, without at any point the experience changing status 
from vision to visualization.21 More generally, as Byrne puts it,
for any episode of visualizing or recalling [a strawberry], it should be 
in principle possible to create a physical picture of a strawberry such 
that viewing the picture in certain conditions exactly reproduces the 
felt quality of visualizing or recalling. And this is what seems wrong 
[in Hume’s view]: any way of degrading the picture, such as blurring, 
desaturating, dimming, and so on, just yields another perceptual experi-
ence, plainly [introspectively] discernable from visualizing or recalling. 
(Byrne 2010, p. 17)
In other words, it is hard to see why the characteristic degradedness of an 
imaginative experience could not be matched by an intentional, willful deg-
radation of a perceptual experience. 
Another epistemological problem with DD is that it is unclear how it 
can allow for mixed episodes, as when I perceive the moon’s front side, 
craters and all, and simultaneously imagine its back side, smooth and even-
surfaced. DD seems to imply that my overall experience should be of a vivid 
cratered-moon image superimposed upon a faint smooth-moon image. But 
if that were the case, my introspection would surely suggest to me that I am 
having a perception of a craterish moon; but in fact it suggests to me that I 
am having simultaneous perceptual and imaginative experiences.22
It might be objected that first-person knowledge of perception and imag-
ination is based not on the phenomenal character of the relevant experi-
ences themselves, but on the processes by which they are formed. Compare 
and contrast: when my visual cortex computes a 15° angle between two 
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edges and produces a visual experience accordingly, I have no introspec-
tive insight into the process by which my experience was formed; but when 
I calculate 15 per cent of the bill and form a thought about the proper tip, 
I am introspectively aware of at least some aspects of the calculation process 
involved. Accordingly, the visual experience feels in some sense passive, 
while the thought feels active. This is the old contrast between receptivity 
and spontaneity in our mental life. The objector suggests that this contrast 
applies to perception and imagination: the former feels passive and recep-
tive, the latter active and spontaneous (see Kind 2001, §3). Thus, when I 
imagine a dog I undergo an introspectively accessible personal-level process 
we might call the “creative exercise of imagination”; no such process takes 
place when I see a dog. On the objector’s suggestion, I can tell by introspec-
tion whether my current experience is imaginative or perceptual by regis-
tering the presence or absence of this personal-level process. No difference 
need be assumed between the phenomenal characters of the perceiving 
and the imagining themselves.
This objection would be particularly embarrassing to Sartre, since he is 
explicitly committed to spontaneity as a distinguishing mark of imagina-
tion (Sartre 1940/2004, Ch.1 §4).23 The obvious problem with it, however, 
is that it does not extend to mental images formed through sub-personal 
processes—what I have called above phantasmagoric experiences. When 
an unbidden image of a smiling octopus pops up in my mind, the process 
producing it is introspectively inaccessible to me—the popping-up of the 
image is something that happens to me, not something that I do. I feel 
receptive and passive rather than spontaneous and active. And yet I am 
perfectly capable of telling whether my experience is perceptual or phan-
tasmagoric. So there must be a deeper dimension along which these two 
differ, which we may then reasonably assume also distinguishes perception 
and imagination.
In general, the notion that perception and imagination differ only with 
respect to degree (of vivacity, resolution, or what not) seems based on two 
ideas: that what makes an intentional state phenomenal is the format of rep-
resentation it uses, and that perceptual and imaginative experiences use 
the same format. But Sartre vehemently rejects the format conception of 
phenomenality. He contrasts, in this context, awareness of public and men-
tal images:
in the case [of public images], when the strictly imaging awareness had 
disappeared, there remained a sensible residue one could describe: 
it was the painted canvas or the spot on the wall . . . [But with men-
tal images,] when the imaging awareness is annihilated, its trans-
cendent content is annihilated with it; there remains no residue one 
could describe . . . We therefore cannot hope to grasp this content by 
introspection. 
(Sartre 1940, p. 76/2004, p. 53; my translation)24
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This passage anticipates Harman’s (1990) rejection of “mental paint,” an 
intrinsic, non-intentional format property of experiences.25 It makes clear 
why Sartre cannot accept any account of the perception/imagination dis-
tinction that implies a central role for representational format.

One objection to Sartre’s argumentation is that there is a more plausible 
version of ND that he ignores. All versions of ND distinguish perception 
from imagination on the basis of accompanying beliefs. But while the ver-
sion Sartre considers appeals to second-order beliefs about what experi-
ence the subject has, another version appeals to first-order beliefs about the 
ontological status of the experience’s object. A perceptual experience is 
accompanied by the belief that its object is real, an imaginative experience 
by the belief that its object is unreal. On this version of ND, we know which 
experience we are having simply by knowing which first-order belief accom-
panies it; this neutralizes Sartre’s epistemological arguments. Ignoring this 
version of ND remains a major lacuna in Sartre’s critique, which we will 
have to address later on.
Bracketing this lacuna for now, the upshot of Sartre’s argumentation is 
clear: there is a phenomenal difference between perceptual and imagina-
tive experiences, and it is not merely a (“quantitative”) difference in degree 
of intensity, resolution, or so on. It is a qualitative difference between two 
kinds of experience. It is “a difference of nature” (Sartre 1936, p. 91/2012, 
p. 83), “an intrinsic distinction” (Sartre 1936, p. 146/2012, p. 134), between 
two sui generis ways intentional objects appear to the subject (Sartre 1940, 
p. 24/2004, p. 13). 
What is this categorical difference between perceptual and imagina-
tive experience? In the final chapter of The Imagination, Sartre articulates 
an initial view whose inspiration he finds in Husserl’s Ideen (Husserl 1913). 
However, in the final pages of The Imagination Sartre argues for a need to go 
beyond this initial view, and in the opening chapter of The Imaginary (pub-
lished already as part of Sartre 1938), he articulates a refined view that goes 
beyond Husserl. I am much more attracted to the initial view, which I pre-
sent and develop in the next section. In the section after that, I will turn to 
Sartre’s argument for refining his initial view and offer reasons to resist it. 
Sartre’s attitudinal account 
The initial view is formulated by Sartre in terms of the manner, or way, 
or mode of intentional directedness at an object. Here is a representative 
passage:
The image of my friend Pierre is not a vague phosphorescence, a wake 
left in my consciousness by the perception of Pierre. It is a form of organ-
ized consciousness that relates, in its manner, to my friend Pierre. It is 
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one of the possible ways of aiming at the thing, Pierre . . . [Accordingly,] 
image is only a name for a certain way that consciousness aims at its object. 
(Sartre 1936, p. 144/2012, pp. 132–133; italics mine)26
This passage raises two questions. First: how are we to understand this talk of 
manners and ways? (It would be nice to be able to “translate” this talk into 
the terminology of contemporary philosophy of mind.) Second: how can 
we characterize the difference between perceptual and imaginative manners 
or ways? (It would be nice to be told not only that the manners are different, 
but also how they are different.)
Sartre’s talk of “manners” and “ways” of intentionally relating to an 
object may be understood in current-day terminology in terms of the dis-
tinction between attitude and content. Believing that p and desiring that p 
have the same content—they both represent that p. If beliefs and desires 
have intensity at all, we may stipulate that S believes that p and desires that 
p with the same intensity. Still, they are clearly very different mental states.27 
What they differ in is attitude: the specific relation they bear to p is differ-
ent. Consciously desiring that p presents p to the subject very differently 
from consciously believing that p. The two cast p under very different lights. 
This attitudinal difference is clearly categorical: there is no continuum that 
leads us from a belief-end to a desire-end.28 
According to Sartre, the difference between perceiving and imagining is 
of the same sort—it is an attitudinal difference. When I perceive my dog and 
when I imagine my dog, the dog presented in my experience is the same, 
and the intensity with which he is presented can be the same, but how it is 
presented is completely different—as different as how p is represented in 
belief and in desire. Sartre writes:
The word “image” thus designates but the relation (rapport) that con-
sciousness has to the object; in other words, it is a certain way the 
object has of appearing to consciousness, or if we prefer, a certain way 
consciousness has of giving itself an object. In truth, the expression 
“mental image” invites confusion. It would be better to say . . . “imaging 
consciousness of Pierre.” 
(Sartre 1940, p. 17/2004, p. 7; my translation)29
Speaking of a mental image of Pierre is ambiguous as between describing 
(i) an awareness of a Pierre-image and (ii) an image-awareness of Pierre. 
Only the latter is accurate. For in the latter, the image term modifies the 
intentional act, not the intentional object. It correctly casts the property 
of being imagistic as an attitudinal property of one’s awareness. Call this the 
attitudinal account of the (phenomenal) difference between perception and 
imagination. 
There is a traditional (and quite natural) view according to which seeing 
O and hearing O have the same content but differ in their mode or way of 
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representing O. One uses a visual mode of representing O, the other uses 
an auditory mode; the difference is categorical. Within this framework, a 
proponent of the attitudinal account would insist that there is also a certain 
attitudinal commonality among all six perceptual modalities of representa-
tion, a commonality not shared by imagining O. Something about all six 
kinds of perceptual experience makes them perceptual, and whatever that 
is, it separates them from non-perceptual attitudes, including imaginings. 
Here too, the difference is one of kind, not degree: imagining O is as cat-
egorically different from perceiving O as seeing O is from hearing O.

How can we characterize attitudinal differences? For example, how can we 
characterize the difference between the belief-ish way of representing and 
the desire-ish way? There are familiar functional distinctions between the 
“belief box” and its inferential role and the “desire box” and its motiva-
tional role. But given our phenomenological concern, we are seeking a phe-
nomenal distinction between the two. (I am assuming here, along with many 
others, that beliefs and desires do have phenomenal properties, including 
attitudinal ones.30) One promising suggestion is that conscious believing 
involves feeling it true that p whereas conscious desiring involves feeling it good 
that p. L. J. Cohen develops this idea:
Feeling it true that p may thus be compared with feeling it good that p. 
All credal feelings, whether weak or strong, share the distinctive feature 
of constituting some kind of orientation on the “True or false?” issue 
in relation to their propositional objects, whereas affective mental feel-
ings, like those of anger or desire, constitute some kind of orientation 
on the “Good or bad?” issue. 
(Cohen 1992, p. 11)
The same view is developed a century earlier by Franz Brentano. In Chapters 
5–9 of Book II of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano devel-
ops a systematic classification of mental phenomena based entirely on “dif-
ferent ways of being conscious of an object” (Brentano 1874, p. 201). A 
key difference is between cognitive acts of “judgment” and conative acts of 
“interest”:
If something can become the content of a judgment in that it can be 
accepted as true or rejected as false, it can also become the object of 
[interest], in that it can be agreeable (in the broadest sense of the 
word) as something good, or disagreeable as something bad. 
(Brentano 1874, p. 239)
The difference, then, is that cognitive states such as belief represent their 
contents as true, whereas conative states such as desire represent theirs as 
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good (in some suitably general sense). This distinction is attitudinal, not 
content-based. Compare:
(B1) Belief B represents p-as-true.
(B2) Belief B represents-as-true p.
On the attitudinal view, B2 is the more accurate way of reporting the repre-
sentational structure of belief; B1 is misleading. Similarly for desires:
(D1) Desire D represents p-as-good.
(D2) Desire D represents-as-good p.
Talk of manners/ways of representing should be understood as insisting 
that D2 is more accurate than D1.
If the belief/desire distinction comes down to a difference between rep-
resenting-as-true and representing-as-good, what is the attitudinal distinc-
tion between perception and imagination? On this, Sartre’s clearest passage 
is the following:
Every awareness posits its object, but each in its own manner. Perception, 
for example, posits its object as existent . . . The intentional object of 
imaging awareness has this peculiarity that it is not there and it is pos-
ited as such, or that it does not exist and is posited as nonexistent, or 
that it is not posited at all. 
(Sartre 1940, pp. 24–25/2004, p. 13; my translation)
The verb “to posit” is unfamiliar in analytic philosophy of mind, but in the 
Husserlian tradition it is commonly used to describe precisely the kind of 
attitudinal feature of an intentional act whereby it presents its object in a 
specific way. In this terminology, we would say that belief “posits” its content 
as true while desire “posits” it as good—without truth and goodness need-
ing to enter the actual content of belief and desire.
With this in mind, the above passage suggests a straightforward view of 
perception’s distinctive attitudinal feature: it represents its object as exist-
ing. This should be interpreted along P2 rather than P1:
(P1) Perceptual experience E represents O-as-existent.
(P2) Perceptual experience E represents-as-existent O.
It is not part of the content of a perceptual experience that its object is real 
or existent. But the characteristic way perceptual experience represents its 
object is under the aspect of existence. 
The view is more complicated when it comes to “imaging awareness” 
(conscience imageante), as the passage offers three different descriptors. The 
first casts the objects “as not there.” In other passages, Sartre also speaks of 
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acts that cast the object “as absent” and “as existing elsewhere.”31 I propose 
that we formulate the canonical report of this kind of act as follows:
(I2.1) Imaging awareness A represents-as-absent O.
Sartre’s second descriptor more clearly calls for the following formulation:
(I2.2) Imaging awareness A represents-as-non-existent O.
The third is odder: Sartre speaks of an object that is not posited at all. 
This might invite all sorts of mysterian readings, if it were not for Sartre’s 
repeated insistence that all consciousness is consciousness-of, that is, inten-
tional consciousness. Given this insistence, I think the only open interpre-
tation is that Sartre has in mind a sensory analog of entertaining that p, 
contemplating that p, apprehending p, and the like “atttidunally neutral” 
propositional attitudes. When you entertain or contemplate the proposi-
tion that there are more than eight provinces in Canada, you are in a state 
that presents the relevant proposition without commenting on its truth or 
goodness. Such states represent their propositional contents neither as true 
nor as good (nor otherwise). They represent them without commentary, so 
to speak. The objectual analog would be a mental state that represented O 
while remaining neutral on O’s ontological status. This suggests the follow-
ing canonical report:
(I2.3) Imaging awareness A merely-represents O.
Here A is said to represent without representing-as. That is an intentional 
act that does not posit its object, that is, an “attitudinally neutral” objectual 
attitude.32
From the passage itself, it is unclear whether Sartre proposes I2.1–I2.3 
as (i) three antecedently plausible options for construing a single attitu-
dinal feature of all imagery, or as (ii) three distinct attitudinal features 
actually exhibited by three different varieties of imagery. Sartre is in fact 
never explicit on this, but the tenor of his subsequent discussion suggests 
(ii). He thus seems committed to a certain heterogeneity among images. 
And indeed, recall that Sartre’s subject matter is wider than just imagina-
tion and covers three different varieties of imagery—what I called imagina-
tive, phantasmagoric, and mnemonic experiences. It would be nice if these 
mapped neatly on to I2.1–I2.3. Sartre nowhere suggests that they do, but I 
want to argue that it is independently plausible. 

Consider imaginative experiences. These were characterized as experiences 
involving deliberate conjuring up of images. Here we exercise our imagination, 
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we are “creative” in producing an image without exogenous stimulation. If 
one is already committed to a categorical attitudinal difference between 
such experiences and perceptual experiences, it is quite plausible to sup-
pose that the difference is simply this: perceptual experiences represent-as-
existent whereas imaginative experiences represent-as-non-existent. Thus, 
one difference between seeing my dog and visualizing a smiling octopus is 
that the former represents-as-existent the dog whereas the latter represents-
as-non-existent the octopus. It might be objected that we can also imagine 
things we know to exist, as when I visualize Barack Obama. But even here, it 
is plausible that my imaginative experience itself represents-as-non-existent 
what it represents; it is just accompanied by an overriding belief that the 
imagined object in fact exists. Compare: looking down from an airplane 
I see tiny houses and cars, but the visual experience is accompanied by a 
belief that these are in fact much bigger. If we try to abstract away from the 
accompanying beliefs, we recognize that imagining Obama in itself repre-
sents-as-non-existent that which is imagined. As I close my eyes and picture 
him, the Obama hovering just there on the other side of my desk is some-
thing I am aware of as unreal; the real Obama is in the White House talking 
to more important people.33 
Consider next phantasmagoric experiences, where an image involuntar-
ily pops up in one’s mind. It is tempting to construe these as essentially 
continuous with imaginative experiences. On closer inspection, however, 
the fact that the imagination is not being consciously exercised, and the 
image is “spat out” by sub-personal processes, seems relevant. It makes it 
quite natural to propose that phantasms are in fact silent on the ontological 
status of their objects, presenting them “without commentary.” If so, phan-
tasmagoric experiences may well be attitudinally neutral in the above sense.
Finally, consider mnemonic experience, the imagery often implicated in 
episodic memory. When I sit alone in a hotel and picture my wife waving 
goodbye at the airport the day before, my experience is not at all in the 
business of denying my wife’s existence. On the contrary, it casts my wife as 
real but not here, or as Sartre puts it, “as existing elsewhere.” The reason I 
miss my wife even more when I picture her thus is precisely that the experi-
ence represents-as-absent something otherwise real. 
If all this is right, then we can refine I2.1–I2.3 to target these three spe-
cific types of imagery. Thus:
(I2.1) Mnemonic experience E represents-as-absent O.
(I2.2) Imaginative experience E represents-as-non-existent O.
(I2.3) Phantasmagoric experience E merely-represents O.
Since our concern in this paper is the relationship between percep-
tion and imagination, what matters for our purposes is the contrast 
between P2 and I2.2. The contrast is extremely straightforward on this 
Sartrean account: it is the contrast between representing-as-existent and 
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representing-as-non-existent. What is not straightforward is the notion that 
these are two attitudinal features that mark a categorical difference between 
the phenomenology of perception and imagination. These attitudinal features 
are moreover constitutive of perception and imagination—they are what 
makes a given experience perceptual or imaginative:
These positional acts [captured in I2.1–I2.3]—this remark is of the first 
importance (est capitale)—are not superadded to the image once it is 
constituted: the positional act is constitutive of the image-awareness 
(conscience d’image). 
(Sartre 1940, p. 24/2004, p. 13; my translation)
Thus the overall view is that there is not only a functional but also a phe-
nomenal difference between perceiving and imagining. Far from being a 
difference in degree, this is a difference in kind, as each presents what it 
does in its own sui generis way. These “ways of presenting” are felt attitudinal 
features: just as conscious belief that p involves feeling it true that p whereas 
conscious desire involves feeling it good that p, so perceiving O involves 
feeling O to be real, whereas imagining O involves feeling O to be unreal. 
Observe that this view, like the version of ND that Sartre failed to address 
(the aforementioned lacuna in his argument), appeals crucially to the dif-
ference between reality and unreality in distinguishing perception and 
imagination. However, while that version of ND builds the reality/unreality 
difference into the content of accompanying beliefs, the present view builds 
it into the attitude employed by perception and imagination themselves. 
This seems to me to have at least two major advantages. First, it vindicates the 
intuition that there is some difference between the experiences of percep-
tion and imagination themselves, regardless of accompaniments. Secondly, 
it makes room for a perception/imagination distinction even in creatures 
completely lacking in the capacity for propositional thought—something 
that the appeal to beliefs about reality and unreality appears to rule out. 
Sartre’s initial account, thus understood, has a clear answer to Q1p and 
Q2p. The phenomenal similarity between perceptual and imaginative expe-
rience is in content: what is represented in consciousness is the same. The 
phenomenal dissimilarity is in attitude: how it is represented is different. As 
we will see in the next section, however, Sartre’s considered view is more 
complex than this. 

I close this section with a historical note on the intellectual lineage of the 
attitudinal account from Brentano through Husserl to Sartre; readers unin-
terested in questions of historical development may skip directly to the next 
section. 
Sartre heard of Husserl from his friend Raymond Aron, upon the lat-
ter’s return from a year at the French Institute in Berlin. Sartre, 28 at the 
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time, was immediately enthralled by the notion of “making philosophy out 
of real life” (that was the gist of Aron’s presentation), and spent the fol-
lowing academic year (1933–34) at the Institute reading mostly Husserl, 
Scheler, Faulkner, and Kafka—and writing a brief note on intentionality as 
the fundamental notion in Husserl’s philosophy (Sartre 1939; see Contat 
and Rybalka 1970, p. 71). Sartre credits Husserl with the attitudinal account 
of the perception/imagination distinction: the fourth and final chapter of 
The Imagination is titled simply “Husserl.” And indeed, Husserl does develop 
such an account, though in his characteristically dense style (Husserl 1913, 
§§111–114). As noted above, however, the general approach of classi-
fying mental states according to their attitudinal properties is central in 
Brentano’s philosophy. Now, Husserl studied with Brentano in Vienna 
between 1884 and 1886, at the impressionable age of 25–27, and when 
Brentano’s Psychology had already gained notoriety (indeed, had become a 
young orthodoxy in some quarters).34 Furthermore, Brentano’s attitudinal 
distinction between belief and desire, or more generally, his classification 
of mental states, is adopted virtually as-is by Husserl (1901, Investigation V, 
Chs. 4–5).35 This raises the question of whether Husserl might have been 
influenced by Brentano in developing his attitudinal account.
It is highly plausible that Husserl was strongly influenced by Brentano’s 
general way of thinking in terms of attitudinal differences and similarities. 
But might he have been influenced specifically with respect to the percep-
tion/imagination distinction?
In the Psychology, Brentano mentions the imagination about a dozen 
times in all, always in passing. In fact, in the entire Brentano corpus there 
is only one sustained discussion of the imagination. This is in the context 
of his lecture notes for a course on “Selected Questions from Psychology 
and Aesthetics” (published posthumously in Brentano 1959). Much of this 
course was dedicated to the concept of imagination or fancy (Begriff der 
Phantasie).36 Brentano covers many issues related to this topic, and in a 
somewhat confusing way, but as Ta˘na˘sescu (2010) shows, “the fundamental 
idea of the [relevant] text is that perceptual representation and imaginative 
representation in the improper sense are different in their . . . modality of 
representation” (Ta˘na˘sescu 2010, p. 58).37 In other words, the difference is 
in the attitudinal features exhibited. 
Interestingly, the course was offered at the University of Vienna in the 
academic year 1885–1886, so just during the window of time Husserl was 
there. There is every reason to believe that Husserl sat in on that course. 
If so, what he heard there may well have had a direct impact on what he 
wrote much later in the Ideen (Husserl 1913).38 Now, there is no reason to 
suppose that Brentano’s attitudinal distinction appeals to the presence or 
absence of representing-as-existent. Brentano speaks, somewhat opaquely, 
of perceptual representation being “intuitive” and imaginative representa-
tion being “conceptual with an intuitive core.”39 But then again, the dis-
tinction in terms of representing-as-existent and contrasting attitudinal 
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features is not all that transparent in Husserl either. In truth it becomes 
clearly  articulated only with Sartre.
What Sartre seems unaware of, however, is the deep influence 
Brentano’s thought exercised on Husserl’s. In this, he is representative of 
French phenomenology at large. There is no more awareness of Husserl’s 
debt to Brentano in Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Ricœur. In 
general, Brentano’s work has seen much less uptake in French philosophy 
than its German, Polish, and Italian counterparts.40 The renowned medi-
evalist Étienne Gilson discussed Brentano’s interpretation of medieval 
philosophy in a 1939 piece (Gilson 1939), and his daughter Lucie Gilson 
offered the first systematic French-language exposition of Brentano only 
in the 1950s (Gilson 1955a, 1955b). Other than that, there is very little 
discussion of Brentano before the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
All the same, it is fair to say that Sartre’s specific attitudinal account of the 
perception/imagination distinction is indirectly influenced by Brentano’s 
attitudinal approach to mental classification and its public application 
to the perception/imagination distinction while Husserl studied with 
Brentano.41
A refined account?
In the last 5–6 pages of The Imagination, Sartre argues that the attitudinal 
difference between perception and imagination, although central, cannot 
be the whole difference; there must be a difference in content as well (Sartre 
1936, pp. 154–160/2012, pp. 137–142). My goal in this section is to argue 
that (i) Sartre’s argument for this is uncompelling, but (ii) some plausi-
ble refinements of the last section’s attitudinal account are nonetheless 
possible. 
Sartre’s argument is based on consideration of what happens, experi-
entially and epistemologically, when we perform Husserl’s “phenomeno-
logical reduction” on perception. In the phenomenological reduction, the 
subject “brackets” the reality of what she is aware of and considers only how 
it appears to her. Suppose I have a perceptual experience of my dog. To 
perform a phenomenological reduction on this experience is to bracket 
the reality of the dog and consider only how he appears to me in my experi-
ence: dog-shaped, mustard-colored, and so on. For Husserl, this means that 
the perceptual experience has undergone a “neutrality modification”: the 
reality commitment built into its attitudinal character or mode of repre-
senting has been neutralized, canceled out. It is “a modification which, in 
a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic 
modality to which it is related” (Husserl 1913, p. 257). Sartre observes that 
the possibility of neutrality modification of a perceptual experience raises 
a question: “how can one distinguish the centaur that I imagine from the 
blossoming tree that I perceive once the reduction is performed?” (Sartre 
1936, p. 154/2012, p. 137). If the key difference between perception and 
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imagination is the attitudinal feature of representing-as-existent involved 
in the former, then as soon as this representing-as-existent is neutralized 
through the reduction I should be unable to tell apart introspectively (thus 
bracketed) perception from imagination. Therefore: 
the distinction between mental image and perception could not come 
from [modes or kinds of] intentionality alone. It is necessary but not 
sufficient that the [kinds of] intentions differ; it must also be that the 
matters are dissimilar. 
(Sartre 1936, p. 159/2012, p. 141)
By “matters,” Sartre clearly means something that contrasts with attitude 
or mode of representation—perhaps intentional content, but more likely 
what Husserl called the hyleˉ : a proto-intentional aspect of experience that 
becomes intentional only by being “intentionally animated” (see Williford 
2013 for recent clarification of this notion).42 Either way, the introspec-
tive discriminability of imagination and neutralized/reduced perception 
implies some non-attitudinal difference between them.43
We might reconstruct Sartre’s argument as another epistemological 
argument by elimination. It starts from an epistemological “datum” regard-
ing what we can know in a characteristically first-personal way: namely, 
whether we are having an imaginative or neutralized-perceptual experi-
ence. The best explanation is then claimed to appeal to first-person knowl-
edge of some non-attitudinal difference between the two. More precisely: 
(1) imaginative experience and neutralized perceptual experience are 
introspectively discriminable; so, (2) there must be a phenomenal differ-
ence between them; but, (3) there is no attitudinal difference between 
them; therefore, (4) there must be some non-attitudinal difference between 
imaginative experience and neutralized perceptual experience.44 
I am not going to challenge premise 1, which seems to me anteced-
ently plausible, nor the inference from 1 to 2, which is required for all 
the epistemological arguments Sartre employs, including those endorsed 
above. But premise 3 is eminently objectionable. When a perceptual expe-
rience undergoes the neutrality modification, it may no longer have the 
attitudinal feature of representing-as-existent. Its commitment to the real-
ity of the perceived object has been bracketed. But this does not mean 
that it has now acquired a new commitment, to the unreality of the object. 
On the contrary, it is genuinely neutral on the object’s ontological status. 
Husserl himself notes that the neutrality modification is “a modification in 
a totally different sense than that of negation” (Husserl 1913, p. 257).45 In 
contrast, the characteristic attitudinal feature of imaginative experiences 
is representing-as-non-existent, a kind of positive commitment to a specific 
ontological status of the object imagined. Thus there is still a clear attitudi-
nal difference between imaginative experience and perceptual experience 
even after the neutrality modification.46
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Sartre could overcome this specific objection by concentrating his 
 argument on the contrast between neutralized perceptual experiences 
and neutralized phantasmagoric experiences. For, unlike imaginative 
experience, phantasmagoric experience does not involve representing-as-
non-existent but only what we called above “attitudinally neutral” mere-
representing. Thus it might be suggested that neutralized perceptual and 
phantasmagoric experiences involve the same neutral(ized) attitude toward 
their represented object, and yet are introspectively discriminable. It would 
then be natural to suggest that their introspectively detectable difference 
must be non-attitudinal.47
The weak link in this revised argument is the notion that a neutralized 
representing-as-existent phenomenally feels the same as attitudinally neu-
tral mere-representing. This conception of the phenomenological reduc-
tion casts it as genuinely altering one’s commitments regarding reality and 
truth, if only for a moment. It is clear, however, that performing the phe-
nomenological reduction involves no such thing. Instead, it involves an ele-
ment of temporary pretense: one does not really change one’s mind about 
how the world is, but assumes the position of someone who does. A phe-
nomenologist standing on the train tracks and bracketing her perceptual 
experience of the coming train is fully alive to the approaching danger; she 
is thoroughly disposed to jump off the tracks in time to save her life. It is 
clear, then, that she continues to be attitudinally committed to the exist-
ence of the approaching train, even as she is engaged in her phenomeno-
logical exercises. 
Compare: suppose S believes that p, in fact has 97 per cent credence that 
p, and on this basis decides to ϕ; and suppose that someone asks S whether 
ϕ-ing would still be appropriate if S only had 50 per cent credence that p. 
In considering this, S must perform a certain operation, but it is not part of 
the operation really to lower her credence by 47 per cent (even for a time); 
it involves something subtler, which we may describe as simulating having 50 
per cent credence that p.48 It would be most accurate to say that S has a cre-
dence of 97 per cent and a pretend-credence of 50 per cent. Now, merely 
entertaining that p is even more thoroughly neutral than having 50 per cent 
credence that p: while the 50 per cent credence does not present p as true, 
it does present p as an object of truth evaluation; it “brings up” the issue 
of truth in a way mere entertaining does not. So, a more radical exercise S 
might be asked to perform is to consider whether she would ϕ if she had no 
credence whatsoever in p but merely entertained that p.49 Again, to consider 
the matter, S would need to perform a certain operation, but it is not part 
of this operation to stop having any commitment on the likely truth of p; it 
only involves pretending or simulating having no such commitment. 
The analogy to the perception/phantasm case is clear. Just as belief 
involves the attitudinal feature of representing-as-true whereas entertain-
ing is attitudinally neutral, so perceptual experience involves the attitudinal 
feature of representing-as-existent whereas phantasmagoric experience is 
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attitudinally neutral. A subject who performs the phenomenological reduc-
tion on a perceptual experience of a coming train does not eliminate her 
commitment to the existence of the train any more than S stops being com-
mitted to the likely truth of p. It is a good question what does happen when 
one performs a phenomenological reduction on one’s train perception.50 
But whatever it is, it cannot involve annihilation without trace of the origi-
nal attitudinal features of the experience. So it is not true that there is no 
attitudinal difference between neutralized-perceptual and phantasmagoric 
experiences. The argument that there must also be a content difference 
therefore fails.

Nonetheless, Sartre’s attitudinal account could bear refinement. Perhaps 
its most notable phenomenological incongruence concerns the contrast 
between perception and the imagery involved in episodic memory. It is 
true that perception presents its object as present, “in the flesh” (to use 
Husserl’s expression), whereas in episodic memory we are aware of the 
object as in some sense absent. But surely the deeper phenomenal differ-
ence between the two pertains to time. When I reminisce about meeting my 
dog for the first time, so little and fearful with his penetrating eyes, I have 
a mnemonic experience whose content may well be identical to that of the 
perceptual experience I underwent that day.51 But the overall phenomenal 
character of the two experiences is certainly different, most perspicuously 
insofar as my current mnemonic experience presents the relevant scene 
as in the past, whereas my past perceptual experience presented the very 
same scene as in the present.52 This phenomenal difference is not captured 
by the distinction between representing-as-existent and representing-as-
absent, at least not in any direct or obvious way. 
To account for this central phenomenal difference, the Sartrean should 
take another leaf from Brentano and introduce a second set of attitudinal 
features, pertaining specifically to time. The relevant distinction Brentano 
posits is between modus praesens and modus passens, as two manners or ways 
of representing objects:
Above all we must designate temporal differences as modes of presenta-
tion. Anyone who considered past, present, and future as differences in 
objects would be just as mistaken as someone who looked upon exist-
ence and nonexistence as real attributes. 
(Brentano 1911, p. 279; see also 
Brentano 1928 Ch.5, esp. § 12)
For Brentano, just as existence and non-existence are not really proper-
ties that some objects instantiate and others do not, so presentness and 
pastness (and futureness) are not really properties of objects. Rather, just 
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as some objects are represented-as-existent and others are represented-as-
non-existent by categorically different mental states, so some objects are 
represented-as-present and others represented-as-past by categorically dif-
ferent mental states. In the first case, the relevant states are perceptual and 
imaginative; in the second, perceptual and mnemonic. Thus the deep phe-
nomenal difference between mnemonic and perceptual experiences is best 
captured not by I2.1 and P2 but by:
(I2.1*) Mnemonic experience E represents-as-past O.
(P2*) Perceptual experience E represents-as-present O.
As for imaginative and phantasmagoric experiences, there are several ways 
to construe their characteristic attitudinal temporal tag, but perhaps the 
most natural is to suppose it is “attitudinally neutral,” that is, that they rep-
resent their objects without any temporal orientation.53 This would not rule 
out imagining or fantasizing something as in the past, in the present, or in 
the future; it would merely require building that temporal reference into 
the content of the relevant act.54
The key to this Brentanoian refinement of Sartre’s attitudinal account 
is the notion that not all attitudinal phenomenal differences must be 
accounted for in terms of a single set of attitudinal features. In addition to 
attitudinal features pertaining to the ontological status of the represented 
objects, Brentano posits also attitudinal features pertaining to their tempo-
ral and modal status.55 (In the last case, Brentano’s distinction is between 
apodictic and assertoric attitudes: the former represents-as-necessary p, the 
latter represents-as-contingent p—see Brentano 1889, p. 82 and Brentano 
1933, p. 25.) For Brentano, the ultimate classification of mental states is 
determined by the various combinations of compossible attitudinal features 
exhibited by states. Thus perceptual experience not only represents-as-
existent but also represents-as-present and represents-as-contingent. It con-
trasts with mnemonic experience insofar as the latter represents-as-past, but 
with imaginative experience insofar as the latter represents-as-non-existent 
(and perhaps with intuitional experiences insofar as those represent-as-
necessary).56 Thus there need not be a single attitudinal dimension along 
which perception contrasts with all types of non-perceptual experience with 
potentially the same content as it. 
It might be objected that there are no phenomenal differences between 
perception and imagery pertaining to time and modality, and any sense of 
such difference derives from accompanying beliefs: when I reminisce about 
meeting my dog for the first time, I believe that the scene I am aware of 
occurred in the past.57 The experiential awareness itself, however, is silent 
on the scene’s time. 
This alternative account parallels, of course, what we called ND. But 
there is no reason to suppose it more plausible. In particular, it will be 
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hard-pressed to account for the first-person knowledge we have of whether 
we are perceiving or episodically remembering. Thus, patients suffering 
from source amnesia have episodic memories of past events without know-
ing when or where they acquired those memories, nor when or where the 
remembered events took place. Nevertheless, they still do seem to them-
selves to be remembering the relevant scenes. That is, they experience their 
episodic memories as memories, and can introspectively recognize them 
as such. They are not inclined to mistake them for perceptions or imagi-
nations. What source amnesiacs appear to lack is the ability to generate 
certain beliefs about the events they seem to themselves to remember. 
Nonetheless, they experience a phenomenology of pastness they can intro-
spectively detect.58
Conclusion
To summarize, contrary to a long Anglo-Saxon tradition, dating back at 
least to Hume, Sartre convincingly argues that there must be a categori-
cal distinction between perception and imagination, a distinction in kind 
and not merely degree. This difference pertains to the manner in which 
the object perceived or imagined is represented in consciousness, that is, 
the kind of attitude consciousness bears to its content. The difference is 
that perception represents-as-existent its object, whereas imagination repre-
sents-as-non-existent its. Sartre also flirts with the notion of a content differ-
ence between the perception and imagination, but this may be just another 
infelicitous Sartrean flirtation.
As noted, this account provides us with answers the two questions we 
started with: (Q1p) What is the phenomenal similarity between perceiving O 
and imagining O? (Q2p) What is the phenomenal dissimilarity between per-
ceiving O and imagining O? The answer to Q1p is straightforward: percep-
tion and imagination are phenomenally similar in having the same kind of 
content. The answer to Q2p is also simple once we appreciate it: perception 
and imagination are phenomenally dissimilar in that they employ different 
kinds of attitude—the manner in which they represent what they do is cat-
egorically, qualitatively different. In a slogan: perception and imagination 
are similar in content, dissimilar in attitude. 
This answer to our organizing question also sketches a phenomenologi-
cal account of the nature of imagination—as well as of perception. It is 
perfectly possible that the deepest nature of imagination and perception 
is functional, that is, to be given by exhaustive specification their func-
tional role within the cognitive architecture of the mind. But our con-
cern here has been with the phenomenological approach to mental life. 
Phenomenologically, the nature of imagination is given by its distinctive 
attitude, its representing-as-non-existent character. More fully, we may pro-
pose the following phenomenological existence and identity conditions for 
imaginative experiences: 
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For any imaginative experience E, E is the imaginative experience it is 
(rather than another imaginative experience) because it bears the con-
tent it does (and not another), and E is an imaginative experience at 
all (rather than a non-imaginative experience) because it employs the 
attitude it does (and not another).
For example, an imaginative experience as of a mustard-colored dog is the 
imaginative experience it is because it is as of a mustard-colored dog and is an 
imaginative experience at all because it represents-as-non-existent that mus-
tard-colored dog. The first half of this provides the (phenomenological) 
identity conditions of imaginative experiences, the second their (phenom-
enological) existence conditions. I leave the formulation of the parallel 
phenomenological existence and identity conditions of perceptual, phan-
tasmagoric, and mnemonic experiences as an exercise for the reader.
Remarkably, the assumptions needed to establish this kind of attitudi-
nal approach to imaginative phenomenology are rather innocuous. One 
assumption is that imaginative and perceptual experiences can have the 
same content; not that they always or even typically do, but just that they 
can.59 The second assumption is that even when they do, the subject can 
have a distinctively first-personal knowledge of which state she is in; not infal-
lible or even privileged or otherwise privileged knowledge, but just distinc-
tive knowledge. If these two assumptions are granted, it is hard to see how 
to avoid the attitudinal account of imaginative phenomenology. According 
to it, there is a categorical difference between imaginative and perceptual 
phenomenology.60
Notes
 1 In fact, there is not only a bewildering variety of imaginings, but also a consid-
erable variety of axes along which they can be distinguished. Here I will distin-
guish them in terms of their intentional character, but there are other ways to 
distinguish very finely varieties of imagination (see, e.g., Stevenson 2003). Many 
have concluded that there is no hope of finding a commonality among all types 
of imagination (see Strawson 1970). A more sustained argument for the funda-
mental heterogeneity of imagination is provided by Kind (2013). This seems to 
me an overreaction, but I bracket the issue here.
 2 When I imagine seeing a dog, there is a further distinction between imagining 
myself as part of the scene, with the imaginative state representing explicitly 
both the dog and me, and imagining the scene as seen from my viewpoint, con-
strued as a sort of zero point of perceptual space.
 3 It may turn out that this conceptual claim is too strong, and there are some 
conceptually possible propositional imaginings that involve no sensory imagery. 
Still, a softer claim in the same spirit (about typical or normal or paradigmatic 
instances, say) is surely right.
 4 Byrne (2010) raises Q1 and Q2 (extended to cover episodic memory) as well, 
but cites functional (dis)similarities to answer them, which suggests that his con-
cern is not with Q1p and Q2p but with their functional analogs. 
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 5 Thanks to Margherita Arcangeli for helping me see this.
 6 On this view, what it is like to have a perceptual experience of a dog and 
an imaginative experience of a dog (at the same distance, of the same shape 
and color, etc.) is strictly the same. The difference between them is entirely non-
phenomenal: the former is, whereas the latter is not, accompanied by the belief 
that there really is such a dog before one. The view is discussed somewhat sympa-
thetically by Russell (1921, Ch. 8), who nonetheless does not end up endorsing 
it, despite adopting an analogous view regarding the difference between percep-
tion and episodic memory (1921, Ch. 9).
 7 Hume writes: “An idea assented to FEELS different from a fictitious idea, that 
the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain 
by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or FIRMNESS, or steadiness” 
(Treatise, I.iii.vii; emphasis original).
 8 DD is intended to exclude KD, something that the present formulations leave to impli-
cature. We can fix this by adding “mere” to DD, or else defining the second account 
of the relationship between perceptual and imaginative phenomenology in terms of 
DD&~KD. In all three theses, we probably have to add a qualifier such as “topically.”
 9 The notion of episodic memory comes from Tulving (1972), who contrasted 
it with “semantic memory,” which concerns remembering certain impersonal 
facts (as when I remember that Pope Benedict IX was 11 years old when he was 
elected to the papacy). Tulving himself characterized episodic memory as con-
cerned exclusively with “personally experienced events” (Tulving 2001: 1506), 
but, as Byrne (2010) shows, this is unduly restrictive. The distinguishing charac-
teristic of episodic memory is that it is imagistic or sensory.
10 We may consider (non-lucid) dreams prolonged phantasma, given their produc-
tion by subpersonal processes consciously uncontrollable by the person. 
11 Throughout both books and without argument, Sartre assumes that for his pur-
poses what I have called imaginative and phantasmagoric phenomena “belong 
together”; his stance toward episodic memory is a bit ambiguous. But the three 
appear on their face to share something rather essential. From the perspective 
of KD, ultimately one might say that there is a phenomenal determinable D 
that all three instantiate but perceptual experience (for example) does not, or 
more minimally that there is another phenomenal determinable D* that per-
ceptual experience instantiates but none of these three does. (As I understand 
him, Sartre assumes the first, stronger claim. We will have occasion to revisit 
this assumption later on.) It is an open question, in any case, whether the dis-
tinctions drawn above with respect to imagination (propositional vs objectual 
imagining, etc.) apply to phantasm and episodic-memory imagery. It is highly 
plausible that they do, but I will not assume as much here. 
12 The relationship between the two is not altogether clear in the text. In The 
Imagination (Sartre 1936), the fact that there are two prima facie independent 
(though clearly related) tenets is not transparent in the text. Only in The 
Imaginary (Sartre 1940) does it become explicit, and the classical conception 
is accused of a “double error” (1940, p. 14/2004, p. 5). This duality is entirely 
missed by Merleau-Ponty in his review of The Imagination (Merleau-Ponty 1936), 
which focuses entirely on the first tenet (admittedly more pronounced in the 
first three chapters of The Imagination).
13 I will often stick to the excellent English translations now available of Sartre’s 
two books. Occasionally, however, I will offer my own translation, rarely very 
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different from the published ones. (There is only one significant translator’s 
decision I have made—see note 24). I will always indicate when I do. In any 
case, with quotes from Sartre I will always cite both the French original and the 
English edition; for quotes from other sources I will only cite the English edition. 
Quotes from the French original of Sartre (1936) will refer to the 1983 reprint by 
Presses Universitaires de France; those of Sartre (1940) refer to the first edition.
14 This is to be contrasted with any intrinsic features of the experiences considered 
in isolation; hence Sartre’s emphasis in the quoted text.
15 If we wanted to formulate the argument with greater precision, we might offer: 
for some subject S and any experience E, such that S is a healthy human adult in 
normal circumstances and E is either a perceptual experience or an imaginative 
experience, 1) S knows whether E is perceptual or imaginative immediately; 2) if 
ND, then S would not know whether E is perceptual or imaginative immediately; 
therefore, 3) ~ND.
16 To that extent, the claim is not undermined by the Perky experiment, where sub-
jects asked to imagine bananas while staring at blank screen were shown (unbe-
knownst to them) increasingly clearer banana images on the screen but failed 
to realize they were now perceiving rather than (merely) imagining bananas 
(Perky 1910). As an alleged demonstration that we are unable introspectively 
to tell apart perception from imagination, the experiment suffers from a variety 
of difficulties (see Casey 2000, 149 for a notable one). But in any case, since the 
circumstances of the experiment are atypical and far from ordinary, they do 
nothing to undermine the claim Sartre needs for his argument.
17 For my part, I have argued for a relevant similar epistemology of first-person 
knowledge in Kriegel (2011, Ch. 1, 2013). In the latter, I present and defend 
a model of first-person knowledge as based on simple endorsement of intro-
spective appearances: one knows that one is having perceptual experience E by 
having an introspective appearance as of having E and endorsing that appear-
ance. If either introspection or endorsement malfunctions, one is liable to end 
up with a false first-person belief, or fail to form a true first-person belief. Thus 
neither infallibility nor self-intimation holds. 
18 We may represent it as follows: 1) if ND were true, acquiring knowledge of 
whether one is perceiving or imagining would be considerably more effortful 
than it in fact is; therefore, 2) ND is false.
19 In sufficiently bizarre settings, I might be unsure whether I am perceiving Pierre 
or hallucinating him. But both perception and hallucination are perceptual 
experiences. Imaginative experiences are another thing still. In standard cases 
where I am unsure whether I am perceiving or hallucinating O, I am still certain 
that I am not imagining O. 
20 Sartre appears to adduce two further arguments, but they are uncompelling.
21 Moreover, when we consider the lowest resolution a perceptual experience can 
have consistently with the laws of nature, it is hard to believe that no imaginative 
experience can match that level of accuracy.
22 Note: this argument does not require the claim that every perception of an 
opaque three-dimensional object involves imagining its invisible parts, the parts 
other than the directly visible surface (Nanay 2010). It only requires the claim 
that it is nomologically possible for us to perceive one part of such an object 
and imagine another simultaneously, and in such a way that the characteristics 
attributed to each part differ.
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23 Thanks to Matthew Eshleman for helping me see more clearly the dialectical 
circumstance here.
24 In this passage (and others), I have translated “conscience” as awareness rather 
than consciousness. In French, the word “conscience” is much more elastic than in 
English. For example, it covers also conscience (e.g., political or moral). As part 
of this, it is noteworthy that there is no distinct word for awareness in French. 
When “conscience” occurs in a noun, or its cognate as an intransitive verb, it is 
natural to translate it as “consciousness”; but when it occurs as a transitive verb, 
it seems to me much more natural to translate it as “awareness.” Although this is 
not a common practice in translation of French phenomenological text, in my 
opinion it should be.
25 Whether in doing so Sartre anticipates also “the transparency of experience” 
(Harman 1990), “representationalism” (Dretske 1995), or “intentionalism” 
(Byrne 2001) is a more delicate question. Sartre clear thinks that all introspec-
tively accessible aspects of experience are intentional. However, as we will see 
in the section on Sartre’s attitudinal account, he does not think that all intro-
spectible aspects of an experience pertain to what is presented by the experience; 
some pertain to the presenting of whatever is presented. This would not qualify 
as transparency or representationalism/intentionalism by most contempo-
rary standards. For a recent argument that Sartre is an early intentionalist, see 
Rowlands (2013).
26 Similar remarks are made in The Imaginary: “whether I perceive or imagine this 
chair, the object of my perception and that of my image are identical: it’s this 
straw chair on which I sit. It is simply that consciousness relates to this same chair 
in two different ways. In both cases, I target the chair in its concrete individual-
ity, in its corporeality. Only in one case, the chair is ‘encountered’ by conscious-
ness: in the other, it is not” (1940, p. 7; my translation, italics original). The 
passage from The Imagination quoted in the main text is still the clearest and 
most explicit.
27 This is not Sartre’s terminology—in fact, Sartre is quite hostile to describing 
conscious episodes as mental states. Here and in the remainder of the paper, I 
use the expression as it is standardly used in contemporary analytic philosophy 
of mind—to denote more or less what Descartes called “thoughts.”
28 Indeed, S’s belief that p and desire that p may be components of a single state, 
say her being glad that p. One might argue that in such a case the intensity of her 
belief and desire states is just the intensity of her gladness state, and therefore 
the same. (The assumption would be that a state such as gladness cannot vary in 
intensity across its different “components.”)
29 The full sentence ending this passage is “It would be better to say ‘conscious-
ness of Pierre-as-imaged’ or ‘imaging consciousness of Pierre’.” I excised the 
expression “consciousness of Pierre-as-imaged” because it seems to me to sug-
gest, misleadingly, a content property of the relevant consciousness (or aware-
ness). It might be claimed that it undermines my attitudinal interpretation of 
Sartre’s account, but given the rest of the text, it rather seems like an instance 
of carelessness on Sartre’s part. Or, perhaps more charitably: Sartre may have in 
mind here that imaged-Pierre is a sort of “formal object” of the image that must 
be distinguished from its intentional object. Consider being afraid of a dog. It is 
commonly claimed, and quite plausibly, that the formal object of fear is danger. 
But this is not to be understood as part of the intentional object/content of fear: 
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what one is afraid of, after all, is just the dog—not the dog’s dangerousness. 
Talk of formal objects seems to be elliptical for something more fundamental. 
Arguably, this “something” is an attitudinal feature of mental states. Thus, it is an 
attitudinal feature of fear that it represents-as-dangerous what it does. 
30 The notion that belief and desire have characteristic or proprietary phenom-
enal properties is often referred to as cognitive phenomenology—see Bayne and 
Montague (2011) for a recent collection pertaining to it.
31 In some places, Sartre takes the last two to be different, thus suggesting that 
there are in fact four types of image: “the imaginary object can be posited as 
nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere, or not be posited as existent” 
(Sartre 1940, p. 232/2004, p. 183). I am going to ignore this wrinkle, nowhere 
motivated by Sartre, in my present discussion.
32 Interestingly, the existence of such attitudinally neutral mental states is recog-
nized by Brentano, where they are claimed to constitute the third fundamental 
category of mental states, in addition to cognitive and conative attitudes. For 
Brentano, there are the categories of judgment and interest, but even more 
basic is the category of presentation (Vorstellung): while the latter is a component 
of all other attitudes, they are not components of it (see Brentano 1874, Book II, 
Chs 6–7).
33 Some might also hold that we cannot imagine Obama himself, as opposed to just 
an Obama-like object. Imaginative reference might be claimed to be “descrip-
tive” rather than singular, putting together a number of feature representations 
but lacking any tracking relation in virtue of which to represent particulars. If 
so, the imaginative experience proper represents-as-non-existent an Obama-like 
object. This response to the objection strikes me as wrongheaded in a number 
of ways, but perhaps some readers would find it credible. 
34 This was so especially in Vienna and Prague, then intellectual centers of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Vienna, Brentano himself wielded this influ-
ence, which extended beyond philosophy (for his place in the general cultural 
context, see Johnston (1972), esp. Ch. 20; for a fascinating analysis of his direct 
influence on Kafka, see Smith 1981). In Prague, it was Anton Marty, Brentano’s 
student in Würzburg in 1868–1869, who presided over a philosophical scene 
centered on Brentanian philosophy (a scene which included the two chief orga-
nizers and propagators of the material from Brentano’s literary estate, Alfred 
Kastil and Oskar Kraus). In those years, every Thursday a group of philosophers 
met at the Louvre café to debate the finest details of Brentano’s thought. 
35 As it was by many of Brentano’s students, notably Marty (1908, Ch. 6). 
Interestingly, even Brentano’s students who developed their own classifications 
of mental states did so by offering revisions to Brentano’s classification, and 
while maintaining the attitudinal framework (see Meinong 1902, Ch. 1).
36 Under this heading Brentano enumerates a great variety of phenomena, includ-
ing mere representations, feverish hallucinations, short-term episodic memo-
ries, dream representations, and more (see Brentano 1959, pp. 43–44, and for a 
systematic discussion, Ta˘na˘sescu 2010).
37 Part of what is confusing in Brentano’s presentation is his distinction between 
representation in the proper and improper senses, which appears to do with 
this: in the improper sense representation is understood in terms of its object, 
what it represents; in the proper sense, it is understood in terms of that plus the 
mode or modality of representation, how it represents what it represents. In the 
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proper sense, suggests Brentano, there is no difference between perception and 
imagination/fancy—but in the proper sense there is (see Brentano 1959, p. 83). 
As Ta˘na˘sescu shows, the notion of content is used by Brentano for the wider 
(finer-grained) proper conception of representation. Not fully appreciating this 
distinction, the editor of these lecture notes, Franziska Mayer-Hillerbrand, casu-
ally replaces mentions of “content” (Inhalt) with “object” (Gegenstand) in key 
passages; but the original manuscripts in Prague show that Brentano’s own talk 
here is of content (Ta˘na˘sescu 2010, fn 31).
38 This is certainly Ta˘na˘sescu’s view—see the last four pages of Ta˘na˘sescu (2010).
39 This is stated explicitly in manuscript Ps 78/2c, B 19759, discussed in Ta˘na˘sescu 
(2010). According to Ta˘na˘sescu, this difference amounts to the difference 
between sensory and non-conceptual representation in the perceptual case and 
more abstract and conceptual representation, but with the undefined “intuitive 
core” in the imagination case.
40 This is so even as many French phenomenologists were cool to Husserl’s “tran-
scendental turn” and sought a much more realist phenomenology, of the sort 
arguably already developed by Brentano.
41 As we will see toward the end of the section, A refined account?, Brentano’s atti-
tudinal framework is more flexible and at the same time more systematic than 
Sartre’s, positing at least three dimensions along which mental states can differ 
in their attitudinal features. At the same time, it is only in Sartre’s work that this 
framework reaches its most plausible development with respect to the specific 
question of the perception/imagination distinction.
42 The disadvantage in postulating a hyletic difference between perception and 
imagination, as opposed to a content difference, is in the mysterious air sur-
rounding the notion of hyleˉ. The advantage is that it does not seem immediately 
implausible the way a content difference does. Yesterday I saw a plane flying 
above my house. It is exceedingly plausible that today I can in principle imagine 
exactly what I saw yesterday—not something very similar to what I saw, but exactly 
what I saw. This means that I can have an imaginative experience with the exact 
same content as yesterday’s perceptual experience, not just a content very simi-
lar to it but differing in some details. Likewise, I can episodically remember or 
fantasize (in the technical sense of having a phantasmagoric experience) exactly 
what I perceived—just as I can entertain or believe exactly the same thing, not 
just very similar things.
43 Sartre is unclear on what that non-attitudinal (hyletic or content-related) dif-
ference might be. In one place, he tentatively floats the possibility that “spon-
taneity” might be involved (Sartre 1936, p. 159/2012, p. 141). But later Sartre 
tells us that its spontaneity is a matter of imagination taking a non-thetic posi-
tion toward itself (Sartre 1940, p. 26/2004, p. 14); this makes it sound like an 
attitudinal feature after all. Another suggestion might flow from Sartre’s claim 
that the imagined object is always exhausted by what the imagining subject 
knows about it, whereas the perceived object overflows what the perceiving sub-
ject knows (Sartre 1940, pp. 20–21/2004, pp. 10–11); this is what Sartre calls 
the “quasi-observational” character of images. It might be claimed this means 
that perception and imagination differ in terms of their contents’ openness to 
interpretation: one can perceive a duck–rabbit figure without the perception 
settling which one it is, but if one imagines a duck–rabbit figure, it must be 
qua duck or qua rabbit (see, e.g., Pylyshyn 2003). However, this account cannot 
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explain  ability to tell apart introspectively perception and imagination in cases 
not involving ambiguous figures. 
44 Throughout this presentation of the argument, a perceptual experience that has 
undergone Husserl’s neutrality modification is called a “neutralized perceptual 
experience.”
45 Indeed, negation itself can undergo a neutrality modification, whereby “negat-
ing is no longer serious negating” (Husserl 1913, p. 258).
46 Furthermore, it is unclear what the argument’s conclusion precisely shows. For 
there may be a non-attitudinal difference between imaginative experience and 
neutralized perceptual experience that does not pertain to their own phenom-
enal characters but to the processes leading up to them. Clearly, the process of 
performing a phenomenological reduction is a conscious, personal-level pro-
cess. It is something that I do, not something that happens to me: a conscious, 
introspectively accessible process. The neutrality modification does not descend 
on my perceptual experience in the dark, without my awareness; it is the result 
of an operation that I myself consciously perform. Therefore, I should be able 
to tell by introspection not only that my neutralized perceptual experience has 
this content and that attitude, but also that it was formed by that particular con-
scious process which is the phenomenological reduction. Crucially, that process 
is absent in the formation of imaginative, phantasmagoric, and mnemonic expe-
riences alike (and other introspectible processes are present at least in some of 
these). This could account for my first-person knowledge of which experience I 
am having.
47 The revamped argument would look like this: (1) neutralized phantasmagoric 
experience and neutralized perceptual experience are introspectively discrim-
inable; so (2) there must be a phenomenal difference between neutralized 
phantasmagoric experience and neutralized perceptual experience; but (3) 
there is no attitudinal difference between neutralized phantasmagoric experi-
ence and neutralized perceptual experience; therefore (4) there must be some 
non-attitudinal difference between neutralized phantasmagoric experience and 
neutralized perceptual experience.
48 Presumably, the purpose of this is to consider what actions the latter recom-
mends. In this respect, the operation is akin to supposing or hypothesizing that 
p in the context of seeing what might follow from it. By the same token, the pur-
pose of performing the phenomenological reduction is presumably to facilitate 
appreciation of the different appearances subtended by the object, in accor-
dance with Husserl’s method for phenomenological inquiry.
49 By “no credence whatsoever” I do not mean a credence of 0%, but rather lack of 
any assignment of credence. 
50 One model might be that one simply adds a new experience to one’s train per-
ception, namely, a “pretend phantasm” of a train. Here there is not so much 
a neutrality modification as a neutrality addition. Another model is that one’s 
perceptual experience is modified in such a way that it no longer exhibits rep-
resenting-as-existent, but a subtler attitudinal feature we may call bracketed-
representing-as-existent. Here there is a neutrality modification, but its result is 
not simple mere-representing that lacks any traces of the original, neutralized 
experience; on the contrary, every neutralized state exhibits its own special atti-
tudinal feature (bracketed-representing-as-true for belief, bracketed-representing- 
as-good for desire, and so on).
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51 It is of course possible that I am misremembering certain details of that encoun-
ter, or have an indeterminate mnemonic representation of a scene whose per-
ceptual representation was fully determinate. But we can readily conceive of a 
pair of experiences, one perceptual and one mnemonic, for which the content 
really is identical. 
52 This phenomenological claim, like any other, may be reasonably denied. I will 
consider the main objection to it at the end of this section. But a more minor 
objection can be addressed now: that unrecognized episodic memories and 
cases in which one is unsure whether one is remembering or imagining show 
that a feeling of pastness cannot be part of the very phenomenology of memory. 
Somewhat paradoxically, such objections falter on the assumption that phe-
nomenology must always be self-intimating and introspection always infallible. 
Otherwise, we can suppose that unrecognized memories, and memories undis-
tinguished from imaginations, have a phenomenology of pastness that intro-
spection, being less than omnipotent, simply misses out on. 
53 With this Brentano may disagree, however. He writes that “no presentation 
could fail to have a temporal mode” and “it is impossible to have a presentation 
of something with a general temporal mode, as though a thing might appear 
indeterminately as past, future [etc.]” (Brentano 1911, p. 280). However, I am 
unaware of any argument for this provided by Brentano. 
54 Compare: desiring ice cream represents-as-good ice cream; believing that ice 
cream is good also represents ice cream as good, but it does so as part of the 
content believed, not as part of the mode of representing (that is, it represents-
as-true that ice cream is good, which is structurally very different from represent-
ing-as-good ice cream).
55 A vague sense of plausibility attaches to this extension when we consider that 
existence, time, and modality have presented distinctive but often parallel chal-
lenges in metaphysics.
56 For example, when the occurrent intuition that identity is transitive dawns on 
one, it represents-as-necessary the transitivity of identity. It may also be held that, 
unlike perceptual experience, imaginative experience represents-as-possible. 
It is often thought that imagination represents possibilia (we cannot imagine 
a square circle, for example). If one held that it represents them as possibilia, 
one could also maintain that it is characteristic of imaginative experience of 
O that it represents-as-possible O; this would be a modal-attitudinal feature of 
imagination. 
57 This is clearly Russell’s view of memory: “Memory demands (a) an image, (b) a 
belief in past existence. The belief may be expressed in the words ‘this existed’” 
(Russell 1921, p. 155).
58 Source amnesia has been known since the later 1950s (see Evans and Thorne 
1966), and has been rigorously studied in experimental settings at least since the 
mid-1980s (see Schacter et al. 1984).
59 Thus we may concede that typically the content of perception presents a higher-
resolution scene than that of imagination—as long as sometimes the resolution 
can be the same. Likewise, we may note that perceptual experience always pres-
ents its object as spatially located relative to the subject, whereas it is possible 
to imagine the same object in an entirely aspatial manner—as long as it is also 
possible to imagine the object as spatially located just the way a perceived object 
is spatially located.
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